Nous présentons un modèle comportemental d'entreprise et de croissance économique dans lequel le niveau d'efficacité économique, le choix de la technologie et le rythme des changements techniques sont affectés par l'organisation de l'entreprise et les variables institutionnelles. Dans ce modèle, les entreprises à hauts et bas salaires peuvent offrir des prix compétitifs, même dans les régimes de produits de marché les plus compétitifs, grâce à l'efficacité générée par l'effet que les taux relativement élevés de rétribution des travailleurs peuvent avoir sur l'organisation de l'entreprise. Dans cette perspective, il n'est pas nécessaire que l'amélioration du bien-être matériel de ceux qui, dans la société, sont relativement moins aisés, se fasse aux dépens des mieux nantis, ni qu'il y ait une relation de dépendance entre plus d'égalité des revenus et croissance. Nos analyses de séries de données internationales viennent étayer cette théorie.
INTRODUCTION
I n this paper, I elaborate upon a behavioural theory of the firm and induced economic growth (Altman 1996 (Altman , 1998 (Altman , 2001a ) that complements both orthodox and non-orthodox growth theories, such as endogenous growth theory, and present here as well a dynamic theory of economic welfare (Altman 2000) that overlaps and extends the global theoretical framework contained in Pareto Optimality. Both of these alternative theoretical frameworks inform our understanding of the complex relationship between economic growth and income distribution, the focus of this paper, with significant potential public policy implications. Unlike conventional economic wisdom, the analytical predictions of the models presented here are consistent with the stylized facts of economic life. For, unlike the conventional model, the behavioural model does not predict that convergence in real per capita output should be taking place amongst nations through market forces or that there exists a fundamental trade-off between income equality and levels of per capita income and per capita income growth. Needless to say, these conventional analytical predictions have been challenged in the empirical literature. Moreover, given that significant doubt has been cast on the technology-cum-education explanation of increasing wage inequality, the model presented here attempts to address the question of changes in wage inequality and its relationship to economic growth as a function of behavioural and institutional variables, which many scholars now agree are largely responsible for contemporary changes in wage inequality. Income or wage inequality and changes therein need not be driven simply by technical variables. In the behavioural model, changes in wage and income inequality can take place independent of technological change and changes in human capital formation. Moreover, increasing inequality is shown to be consistent with, and a potential cause of, lower levels of per capita income and higher levels of economic inefficiency. 1 To elaborate, the conventional theoretical economic wisdom is grossly inconsistent with three basic stylized facts.
1. Convergence has not occurred (Bairoch 1978; Baumol 1986; Baumol and Wolff 1988; Boyer 1996; DeLong 1988; Pritchett 1997) . The traditional perspective predicts that the per capita real income of nations should converge over time as capital flows from the richer to the poorer countries and labour, from the poorer to the richer countries. Even without such mobility, convergence is expected to take place through the effects of international trade, as the poorer, lowwage economies are expected to make gains relative to the wealthier, higher wage and, therefore, higher cost, economies. The forces favouring convergence are accentuated when one introduces the possibility of technology and knowledge transfers. However, contrary to what is expected by the conventional economic wisdom, market forces have not generated convergence in real per capita income, except amongst a few select, developed economies. Market forces have not achieved what many have expected of them, ending the significant disparity of income per person amongst nations (Olson 1996; Parente and Prescott 2000) . Indeed, such disparities have only increased over historical time (Altman 1999a; Bairoch 1978; Pritchett 1997 ). 2
2. There appears to be no so-called equity-income or equity growth trade-off (Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa 1999; Osberg 1995; Todaro 1989 ; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1998). Following upon the work of Simon Kuznets (1955) , the conventional wisdom maintains that income inequality within nations can be expected to increase over the course of the initial stages of economic development, as per capita income enters into a period of sustained economic growth, and to diminish as economies enter into more advanced stages of economic development. This relationship between the growth of per capita income and income equality is referred to as the inverse-U hypothesis. It is, therefore, stipulated that an inverse relationship exists between equity and per capita income growth as countries develop. Moreover, economists have tended to support the view that income redistribution yielding more income equality damages the growth process by reducing profits and increasing production costs. This position is reinforced in a theoretical vein by the conventional welfare literature, dominated by the concept of Pareto Optimality, which stipulates that any form of income redistribution reduces the economic well-being of society. But the empirical literature does not support the notion of an equity-growth or equity-income trade-off. In a most recent comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa write: "the picture they draw is impressively unambiguous, since they all suggest that greater inequality reduces the rate of growth" (1999, p. 1617) . Moreover, "the traditional view in economic theory, then, is that there is a fundamental trade-off between productive efficiency (and/or growth) and social justice … Overall, the view that inequality is necessary for accumulation and that redistribution harms growth is at odds with the empirical evidence" (ibid., p. 1620). Todaro (1989, pp. 165-66 ) makes a similar point: "few development economists would argue that the Kuznets process of increasing then declining inequality is inevitable. There are now enough case studies and specific examples of countries like Taiwan, South Korea, China, Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, and others to demonstrate that higher income levels can be accompanied by falling and not rising inequality. It all depends … on the nature and character of the development process." These findings, which contravene the conventional economic wisdom, are elaborated upon below in an analysis of income and income inequality datasets. 3
3. In addition, the conventional model predicts that decreasing wage inequality, which is a product of institutionally based (minimum wages and unions) income increases of the relatively lower percentiles of the wage distribution should reduce growth and employment. But there is no apparent relationship between such wage compression and increasing production costs or increasing unemployment (Card and Krueger 1995; Freeman and Medoff 1984) . These empirical findings are of particular importance given the evidence that institutional factors such as minimum wages, unions, and governmentinduced low levels of unemployment serve to reduce wage and income inequality as opposed to, or in addition to, relative changes in the supply and demand for a specific type of labour (Atkinson 1997; Blau and Kahn 1996; Lemieux 1997, 2000; Freeman 1996; Galbraith 1998; Howell 1999 ).
The behavioural model of growth discussed here is based upon a behavioural modelling of the economic agent and the firm discussed in detail elsewhere (Altman 1996 (Altman , 1998 (Altman , 2001a . Moreover, the argument presented in this paper builds upon some significant insights into the growth process made by Adam Smith and Arthur Cecil Pigou who argue that income redistribution to the relatively less well-off can be expected to induce improved economic efficiency (Altman 2000) . I also borrow from the work of economic historian John Habbakkuk (1962) who argues that relatively higher wages have, historically, induced increased efficiency and higher rates of technical change. In addition, the basic behavioural framework builds upon Harvey Leibenstein's x-efficiency theory and the related efficiency wage literature (Akerlof and Yellen 1986; Stiglitz 1987) . Using the more realistic behavioural assumptions embedded in efficiency wage and xefficiency theory, I argue that there are at least two sustainable paths to economic growth. At one extreme is the low-wage path and at the other is a high-wage path. The latter is associated with a higher level of equilibrium per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) and the former with a lower level. Convergence in real per capita output need not take place through the workings of the free market. Moreover, competitive pressures (or market forces in general) need not result in the convergence of wage rates. In a word, what I show here is that both a low-wage economy and a high-wage economy can be consistent with a competitive economic regime in the long run. But a high-wage economy potentially yields a higher level of material well-being for all the members of a given economy. I further maintain that in the short run and, under certain conditions in the longer run, the high-wage economy may also be characterized by a higher rate of growth.
High wages serve to pressure firms to become more efficient and innovative, whereas low wages allow firms to engage in less efficient economic behaviour, all the while remaining competitive and profitable. For this reason, high wages are viewed as a potential boon to the process of economic growth and development, whereas low wages are viewed as a potential drag. This is contrary to the view typically held by both neo-classical and non-conventional economists wherein high wages are considered to be an anathema to the growth process. In the model presented here, rational economic agents can choose between different available growth paths. There is no one road to growth. The choice made, however, affects the long-run equilibrium level of real per capita GDP and the rate of economic growth. In my model, choosing the low-wage growth path would have predictable negative consequences for the level of material well-being for the majority of a region's population. And to the extent that the purpose of growth is to allow for the maximization of the consumption basket of the typical consumer, the "preferred" path to growth of the conventional wisdom, the low-wage path, generates inferior or suboptimal welfare outcomes. Only if the low-wage path is deemed the only path to growth, can the low-wage path to growth and all that it entails be considered in any way optimal or welfare maximizing.
What I argue, therefore, is that there is no theoretical reason to expect convergence to take place, even in the competitive long run. There is also no good theoretical reason to predict, ex ante, that more equity or, closely related to this, higher rates of labour compensation, need result in less growth and, therefore, invariably, to lower levels of per capita income. The market economy is, from the perspective presented here, consistent with wide and persistent divergences in per capita income as well as with higher wage-more equitable economies that are both high growth and competitive. In this scenario, there need not be any equity-income trade-off. More equity, that is a product of relatively higher real wages, can even yield a higher and sustainable level of real per capita income. This does not imply that more income or wage equality causes more per capita growth. Rather, what is argued from the perspective of the behavioural model presented here is that more income equality that is a product of increasing real wages and improved working conditions can yield higher rates of per capita growth. Increasing income inequality per se is no panacea for laggard economic growth performance.
WHAT IS INEQUALITY?
The empirical and theoretical literature speaks to different types of inequality. The theoretical core of this paper focuses upon wage changes and how this might impact upon wage and income inequality. The most general measure of inequality is family-income inequality. This particular measure is the focus of much of the empirical literature. It is important, therefore, to appreciate what drives family-income inequality and it is equally important to understand that change in wages plays a fundamental role in driving changes in income inequality (Atkinson 1997; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997) . Measures of family-income inequality are based on the construction of family-income estimates. Of course, a critical component of family income is the wage that active family labour market participants receive as employees. However, the number of family members who are employed, hours worked by these same family members, and investment or capital income, also determines family income. Family income can also be estimated, pre-tax and pre-transfer or post-tax and post-transfer. Holding wage rates constant, family income can vary considerably given variations in employment, hours worked, investment income, tax rates, and transfers. For this reason, measures of income inequality can vary independently of wage rates and changes in relative wage rates, where the latter two variables are the focus of the theoretical thrust of this paper.
A simple measure of income inequality between two groups, a and b, where a is the top income decile and b is the bottom income decile, can be expressed as: where INE is family-income inequality, w is the wage rate, L is the number of employed household members, H is total annual hours worked per employed household member, K is capital income, NT is transfer income net of taxes. Income inequality is generated, for example, when the divorce rate increases, reducing the number of employees (L) in the household, thereby reducing the income in the affected households relative to the households not subject to divorce. In the United States, divorce has played an important role in increasing income inequality (Burtless 1999 (Burtless , 2001 ). Also, changes in hours worked can affect the extent of income inequality (Bell and Freeman 2000; Osberg 2001) . Ceteris paribus, reducing hours worked in group a yields less income inequality while increasing hours worked increases income inequality. An important factor preventing American income inequality from rising any more than it did was increasing hours worked at the bottom end of the income distribution, whereas in Germany an important factor contributing to increasing income inequality was the fall in hours worked at the bottom end of the distribution. Of course, income inequality can increase, holding all other variables constant, simply by increasing capital income at the top end of the income distribution. Therefore, differences in income inequality across countries and cross-country changes in income inequality can be driven by variables, other than wages, which is the focus of this paper and a large segment of the theoretical literature on income inequality. Nevertheless, it is wage inequality and changes therein that tend to drive income inequality and changes in income inequality.
SOME STYLIZED FACTS
In an effort to supplement the existing inventory of evidence on the relationship between income and income inequality, I present income-inequality estimates from World Bank sources and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and estimates for real gross GDP per person and per worker from the Heston and Summers databank. As well, I construct growth rates from the output estimates. The income inequality and the output and growth estimates are crossranked with each other to determine the relationship between income inequality and per capita and per worker output and income inequality and economic growth. The estimates for the Gini coefficients and the income held by the highest and lowest quintiles of the population are measures of family-income inequality, not wage inequality, albeit wage inequality is an important component of this. The inequality estimates are far from perfect and are not easily comparable across nations and across points in time (Atkinson 1997) . Nevertheless, although the results they yield must be taken with more than a few grains of salt, they are drawn from data that are commonly used and they paint a rough picture of the relationship between GDP, labour productivity, and income inequality. Table 1 presents data and estimates on GDP per capita and income distribution for the 1960-90 period, whereas Table 2 does the same for GDP per worker. One question addressed by these tables is the cross-sectional relationship between GDP per capita and GDP per worker and income inequality. The per capita and per worker estimates are ranked in descending order while the measures of income inequality are in ascending order so that the most egalitarian economy is ranked number 1. These data are for 83 countries, the only ones for which both output and income equality estimates are available. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients, which correlate the rankings of the above variables, are 0.46 for the Ginis and per capita GDP and 0.49 for the Ginis and GDP per worker. In other words, income equality is positively related, in terms of ranking to GDP per capita and GDP per worker. Moreover, the coefficients suggest a strong relationship. The correlation coefficients relating GDP per capita and per worker to Ginis are both negative, -0.51 and -0.42 respectively, suggesting that there is a strong and negative relationship between both output variables and income inequality. Increases in the output variables are negatively related to increases in income inequality. In other words, these simple statistics suggest that higher levels of per capita GDP and labour productivity tend to coincide n/a n/a n/a n/a Seychelles 2.89 61 3.78 7 1.31 3,973 43 n/a n/a n/a n/a Gabon 6.74 6 -0.26 82 -3,958 44 n/a n/a n/a n/a Syria 3.74 38 2.06 25 0.55 3,897 45 n/a n/a n/a n/a Poland n/a 108 -0 n/a n/a n/a n/a Benin 0.34 91 -1.05 93 -920 87 n/a n/a n/a n/a Kenya n/a n/a n/a n/a Notes: All per capita GDP growth rates are derived from real GDP estimates expressed in 1985 international prices based upon purchasing power parity conversions of output values. The income distribution estimates are based on estimates from the World Bank (2001). These estimates refer to total household income for the high-income economies and largely to per capita income and consumption for the lower income economies. For the latter economies, these estimates are adjusted for household size. Sources: Heston and Summers (2001); World Bank (2001, ch. 12 ). n/a n/a n/a n/a Iran 5.55 13 -2.69 105 -11,400 42 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Seychelles 3.21 53 4.26 3 1.33 9,137 50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Cape Verde Island 0.87 91 2.77 11 3.17 2,755 80 n/a n/a n/a n/a Cameroon 2.48 67 1.41 36 0.57 2,489 81 n/a n/a n/a n/a Sierra Leone n/a 108 -0 n/a n/a n/a n/a Chad 0.02 98 -2.45 104 -1,148 104 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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with relatively lower levels of income inequality. Therefore, the cross-sectional data suggest that increases in these output variables do not go hand in hand with increases in income inequality. 4 Some of these facts are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 , which are drived from Tables 1 and 2 respectively. What is clear from these figures is that the lowest GDP per capita and per worker economies are characterized by the most income inequality, while the highest GDP per capita and per worker economies coincide with the relatively lowest levels of income inequality. It is also clear that low levels of per capita output are achieved over a wide range of income inequalities. Low income inequality is obviously not a sufficient condition for high levels of per capita output and labour productivity. On the other hand, a range of low Ginis coincides with a wide range of per capita output levels. Although low income inequality correlates well with high GDP per capita and per workers, low income inequality is not sufficient to realize high measures of output. However, low income inequality does not seem to impair the achievement of high per capita GDP and labour productivity. Although a relatively high level of income inequality characterizes the United States, output measures not so far removed from the American economy are realized in economies that are much more egalitarian.
The available data are used to generate growth estimates, and these are related to the available estimates for income inequality. Growth estimates are constructed for two period, 1960-73 and 1973-90 . The former period is often associated with proactive government measures to achieve low levels of unemployment and also with relatively low levels of income inequality. The latter period, in contrast, is associated with higher levels of income inequality and with government concern over inflation (Maddison 1991 interesting about these estimates is that although there has been much discussion about technical change driving increasing income inequality over time, to the extent that labour productivity growth is a proxy for technical change, the rate of technical change appears to have diminished substantially over the 1960-90 time frame. The growth estimates for the 1973-90 period are ranked in descending order and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are calculated for the ranking of the growth in GDP per capita and labour productivity and the ranking of Ginis. This is to provide some rough information on the relationship between growth and income inequality. The correlation coefficients are 0.51 and 0.49 respectively, suggesting that there is a strong positive relationship between growth and income equality. These results, for labour productivity growth, are illustrated in Figure 3 , which is derived from Table 2. The worst performing economies are those with the highest Ginis. The strongest growth is generated in those economies with the lowest Ginis, with some important exceptions, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Korea. But even in these cases, income inequality is far less than in a wide range of slow-growth economies. Moreover, the highest growth performers of these outliers, Taiwan and Korea, are more egalitarian than Indonesia or Thailand.
One last set of estimates is provided in Table 3 and Figure 4 , which is derived from Table 3 . For countries for which Ginis are available, I calculate the change in Ginis over the 1970s and 1980s and relate these changes to labour productivity growth in the 1973-90 period. The Gini estimates are far from perfect or comparable, but be this as it may, they reveal that income inequality increased in a big way in the United States and the United Kingdom, although 12 of the 18 economies considered experienced some increase in inequality. The Spearman Productivity Growth and Changes in Inequality rank correlation coefficient for the rankings of growth and changes in income inequality, 0.58, suggests a strong positive relationship between labour productivity growth and either the greatest fall in income inequality or the relatively smallest increase. A clear exception to this is Japan, which was number one in growth but number 13 in terms of changes in income inequality. The UK is also somewhat of an outlier here as well. The US, which is typically the focal point of discussion on income inequality, sits squarely, not only as one of the poorest productivity performers in our sample, but also one with the second greatest increase in income inequality. 5 The estimates presented here speak against the hypothesis that increasing technical change, proxied by increasing labour productivity growth, serves to increase income inequality. 6
The estimates presented here are consistent with the view that high levels of income inequality and increases in income inequality are not necessary conditions for high levels of per capita output and labour productivity. Moreover, these estimates are consistent with the view that less income inequality need not yield low levels of per capita GDP and labour productivity or low growth rates of these variables. These estimates also cast doubt on the view that increasing rates of technical change have been responsible for increasing levels of income inequality. The behavioural model discussed in this Notes: Labour productivity growth is estimated from output per worker estimates ( Table 2 ). The changes in the Ginis are expressed in absolute terms.
Sources: Table 2 ; Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, Appendix) ; Deininger and Squire (2000) .
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CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXIX, SUPPLEMENT/NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL 2003 paper provides one possible explanation for how more equity, driven by increases in wages, is consistent with high levels of per capita GDP and labour productivity and with higher rates of economic growth.
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The conventional wisdom assumes that the economy is x-efficient in terms of effort inputs and also in terms of the choice of technology. What is meant by x-efficiency is that the economy is assumed to be always operating along the production possibility frontier. Effort per unit of input is therefore maximized and cost-minimizing technology is adopted in this scenario, thereby maximizing output per person, irrespective of the system of industrial relations in place within the firm and related rates of labour compensation (Leibenstein 1966 (Leibenstein , 1978 (Leibenstein , 1979 . 7 It is therefore assumed that effort discretion does not exist in terms of economic agents having some choice over how hard or how well they work. On the other hand, effort discretion is a necessary condition for the existence of x-inefficiency. It is facilitated by the existence of incomplete contracts (based on their transaction costs) and different behavioural functions, especially between employees or agents of the firm, and members of the firm hierarchy or its principles (Akerlof and Yellen 1986; Altman 1996; Miller 1992; Stiglitz 1987) . The conventional wisdom also assumes that the rate of technological change is determined exogenously, outside of the causal boundaries of the model. All told, it is assumed that there are no large bills lying around just waiting to be picked up. Society is doing the best it can, given the constraints faced by economic agents, such as imperfect information and transaction costs. The conventional model is therefore consistent with a fundamental principle of contemporary economic theory which McCloskey has referred to as the American Question or the Axiom of Modest Greed: "The Axiom of Modest Greed involves no close calculation of advantage or large willingness to take risks. The average person sees a quarter and slides over it … he sees a $500 bill and jumps for it. The Axiom is not controversial. All economists subscribe to it, whether or not they believe in the market … and so should you" (1990, p. 112) . This is what conventional economic theory predicts rational economic agents must do. If they do not, then market forces will make them do it. The big bill hunters and gatherers will out-compete their relatively lazy competitors and drive them into economic purgatory or to the production-possibility frontier (Altman 1999b; Reder 1982) . In other words, for firms to remain competitive, they must be x-efficient.
The conventional assumption with regard to xefficiency in production yields important analytical predictions with regard to the potential economic impact and the welfare implications of income redistribution. These analytical predictions are, in turn, embedded in the concept of Pareto Optimality, which serves as a basis for public policy discussions related to income redistribution. Within this modelling framework, absence the existence of relative price distortions and, therefore, the existence of allocative efficiency and given the assumption of x-efficiency, it follows that income redistribution is a zero-sum game: that which goes to labour, for example, reduces the income to employers. Pareto Optimality, the best of all possible economic worlds, is given by the realization of the joint conditions of allocative and x-efficiency. Given the assumption that income redistribution has no effect on efficiency, any existing income distribution at hand is not considered to be of economic importance since it is assumed that one cannot and should not make interpersonal comparison of the utility attached to a particular distribution. It is assumed without any empirical backing, for example, that the marginal utility of real income is the same for both the poor and the rich. So, income redistribution cannot, by assumption, yield increases in aggregate social utility or welfare. 8 On the other hand, if it is assumed that income redistribution negatively affects efficiency, income redistribution has the dynamic effect of reducing savings and therefore growth and can, thus,
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In contrast to this conventional perspective on income redistribution, the argument flowing from the behavioural model of economic growth is that there need not be an equity-efficiency trade-off in a competitive market economy to the extent that wages positively affect productivity and do not increase production costs. Therefore, shifting from a low-to a high-wage economy can be welfare improving. This behavioural model of economic welfare, which is interconnected with the behavioural model of growth, paints a dynamic picture of economic welfare in contradistinction to the static framework provided by Pareto Optimality. In this dynamic scenario, the conditions of Pareto Optimality need not be violated, in the sense that it becomes possible to redistribute income to the relatively less well-off without, in the long run, reducing the economic welfare of the relatively well-to-do. Indeed, such redistribution might serve to induce increasing efficiency and technological change, thereby increasing the economic welfare of all members of society.
From the perspective of the Edgeworth Box diagram, increasing the real income or non-pecuniary benefits to workers in period t 0 serves to increase the size of the economic pie in period t 1 , through its dynamic affect on economic efficiency. In Diagram 1, if x-efficiency is assumed and C XI H XI is the production-possibility frontier for cars and housing, any redistribution of income yields a reduction in economic welfare to at least one individual -a clear violation of Pareto Optimality. This would be the case, for example, if income is reallocated from individual a to b yielding a change in the equilibrium distribution of income (zero allocative inefficiencies) from e 0 to e 1 . However, if C XI H XI is an x-inefficient production possibility frontier, a redistribution of income from a to b might result in an increase in the level of x-efficiency, shifting the frontier for cars and housing outward to C XE H XE . In this scenario, income redistribution need not result in there being any losers to the extent that the economic An important footnote to this discussion is Pigou's analysis of market economies which argues for income distribution away from high-income individuals to the extent that a dollar shifted in this direction has a higher marginal product for lowerincome individuals in terms of productivity effects from higher food intake, improved health, and improved or higher levels of human capital. Pigou argues that increasing the income of the less wellto-do serves to improve their productivity, by enhancing their capacities as workers by improving the nutritional levels and health of workers. In addition, investing in the education and skill upgrading of labour also has the effect of increasing labour productivity (Pigou 1952, ch. 10 
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investing in plant and equipment. Investing in the health and nurture of the sick will also yield high returns by improving the capacity of workers (ibid., pp. 746-49). He writes: "Here there is immense scope for profitable investment. It is just when their children are young, and, therefore, in many ways afford the most fruitful soil for investment, that poor families find themselves in the greatest straits, and, therefore, least able to provide adequately for them" (ibid., p. 750). Education and the general training of workers is connected to investments in the nourishment, housing, and medical care of the children, if education is to build up their productive capacities. A poorly fed, housed, and sickly child could not effectively learn (ibid., pp. 751-54). In effect, Pigou speaks to market failures with regard to the investment in human capital formation.
Such market failures are now an important topic of analysis in recent efforts to explain why less income inequality is not necessarily connected with a poorer growth record (Aghion 1998; Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa 1999; Osberg 1995) . This Pigouvian-type analysis in effect argues that income redistribution increases the size of the economic pie as government intervenes to correct for systematic market failures. Hence, redistributing income need not negatively impact on economic growth or on the level of real per capita income realized in the affected economies. This being said, the focus of this paper is not on the economic significance of Pigouvian-type income redistributions in a world of market imperfections. Rather, the focus here is upon changes in income inequality that are independent and unrelated to these types of market imperfections. What is of concern here is how labour-market-related institutions can affect the distribution of income and how this might be efficiency and, thereby, growth enhancing.
THE BEHAVIOURAL ALTERNATIVE
In the behavioural model of the firm upon which the behavioural theory of growth is based, as in the conventional one, economic agents are assumed to be rational, in the sense that they are calculating and forward looking. Unlike in the conventional model, however, economic agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in preferences with respect to the working conditions and the underlying system of industrial relations prevailing in the firm. For simplicity, assume that all firms produce an identical homogeneous output. Also assume two groups of economic agents, employees and employers, where preferences are homogeneous within each group, but heterogeneous between groups. Assume the objective function of workers or employees is concerned with adjusting the quality and quantity of effort inputs per unit of time to the prevailing system of industrial relations. It is, therefore, assumed that effort discretion exists. Effort inputs are increased as wages and/or working conditions improve. Only under an ideal system of industrial relations are effort inputs maximized and, therefore, x-efficiency achieved. However, the preferences of many employers, who are the pre-eminent decisionmakers within the firm, are for short-term economic gain, no or little power-sharing between workers and owners, and low-wage systems of industrial relations, all of which can yield x-inefficiency in production. In the absence of material gains to the decisionmakers, for example, in terms of lower unit costs or increased profits, the realization of x-efficiency can be obtained only if the preferences of the decisionmakers shift toward an x-efficient consistent system of industrial relation (Altman 1996 (Altman , 2000 (Altman , 2001b Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Gordon 1998; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Strauss 1996; Levine and Tyson 1990) . 9 I also assume that technological change (whether or not a firm adopts an available technology) is a function of, or is induced by, relative production costs. This relates to the theory of induced technical change (Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Hicks 1932; Ruttan 1997) and to the role of effort discretion in determining technological change (Leibenstein 1973 (Aghion and Howitt 1998; Fortin and Helpman 1995; Helpman 1992; Romer 1990 Romer , 1994 . 10 This said, in a behavioural model of the firm output is not only a function of the traditional variables capital, labour, and technology, but also of effort inputs as in the following equation:
where Y is real output or income, A is technology, K is capital, L is labour, and ε is effort.
Given the existence of effort discretion and the assumed causal linkage between wages, working conditions, and the overall system of industrial relations and effort inputs, in the behavioural model, unlike in the conventional model, unit costs need not be affected by changes in factor prices, inclusive of the price of labour which serves here as a proxy for all labour-related costs. X-inefficient firms can survive even with perfect product markets if wage rates differ between firms and if the different wage rates and the work cultures or systems of industrial relations, for which they may be a proxy, affect labour productivity by affecting the effort inputted into the process of production. Given technology, at least for an array of wage rates, there may be a unique unit cost of production. On the flip side, there need not be any unique wage rate or labour compensation package that minimizes costs or maximizes the level of profits. Induced technological change only reinforces this argument.
The following two equations and Diagram 2 serve to illustrate this argument:
where AC is average costs; OC L is the cost of organizational capital per unit of labour input; w is rate of labour compensation; L is labour input; and Y is output. For simplicity, I assume that labour is the only factor input and that the cost of labour is comprised of wages and organizational capital, those investments in the work culture of the firm that positively affect effort inputs (Tomer 1987) . Equation 3 can be rewritten as:
Given the assumptions of the model, a low-wage regime goes hand in hand with a low productivity regime and a high-wage regime goes hand in hand with a high productivity regime and the two wage regimes need not necessarily yield any differences in unit costs or even in rates of return. In this case, high-wage firms can compete with low-wage firms by becoming more productive, where output is a function of effort per unit of labour input as well as of labour, capital, and "technical change." In Diagram 2, there is a unique average cost C* that is associated with an array of labour costs or wage and other labour costs up to W* where diminishing returns set in with respect to the relationship between effort inputs and these labour costs. diminishes sufficiently as one moves from W* to 0, sufficiently to offset any potential gains to the firm that might accrue from lower wages, working conditions, and other related labour costs. At W* x-efficiency in production is achieved. Further, increases in labour costs can be compensated for through induced technological change, discussed below (Altman 2001a) . Technological change serves to shift the unit cost curve to the right to C*BD.
This behavioural approach to the firm, it should be noted, differs in important ways from Leibenstein's x-efficiency theory, where x-inefficiency in production results in higher unit production costs and can be sustained only in a highly imperfect or protected product market environment. In effect, in Leibenstein's world, suboptimal or x-inefficient effort inputs occur largely independently of wage rate and the work culture of the firm. In this scenario, changes in effort inputs yield changes in productivity yield changes in unit costs as per equations 3 and 4 (Leibenstein 1966 (Leibenstein , 1979 . The approach presented here also differs from the traditional efficiency wage modelling of the firm where there is a unique wage (the efficiency wage) that yields a unique minimum unit cost of production through its impact on effort inputs. All rational firm decisionmakers would choose, in this scenario, this unique wage and therefore all firms would be paying the efficiency wage (Akerlof and Yellen 1986; Altman 2001a, ch. 1; Stiglitz 1987 ). This assumes a non-linear and mechanical relationship between wages and effort inputs that need not be obtained in the real world (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Stiglitz 1987) .
In the behavioural model, employers have no material incentive to become more x-efficient if this accrues to them no advantage in terms of unit costs, profits, or own-income. The industrial relations literature clearly finds that making workers more efficient is a costly process. This same literature finds that most firms have not adopted the available and known more x-efficient systems of industrial relations. Why? In the behavioural model, workers eat up the productivity gains from their increased efficiency. If this were not the case, rational firm decisionmakers would choose to design a more xefficient firm, especially if subject to competitive product market forces. There is also a disincentive to become more x-efficient if this involves a loss of power and prestige within the firm to employers as well as the reduction in the percentage of the firm's labour force that consists of management. In this scenario, an economy would be x-inefficient, even given the availability of relatively x-efficient alternatives, resulting in a loss of income to society at large (Altman 1996 (Altman , 2000 (Altman , 2001b Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Gordon 1998; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson and Strauss 1996; Levine and Tyson 1990) . X-inefficiency is here a product of the rational private choices made by the firm's decisionmakers.
In this behavioural modelling of the firm, the relatively x-efficient system of industrial relations, with their higher rates of labour compensation and overall higher levels of working conditions, would be preferred by workers. However, in this model, the firm's decisionmakers prefer the less costly, more hierarchical x-inefficient system of industrial relations, as long as it is cost competitive. The firm can be induced into adopting more efficient methods of firm organization as labour costs rise or as preferences of firm decisionmakers shift toward more x-efficiency in production. Also, the legal environment of a country might have the same effect (Buchele and Christainsen 1995; Gordon 1996 Gordon , 1998 . Ceteris paribus, the supply of jobs in x-efficient firms is, therefore, a product of the availability of the low-wage x-inefficient alternatives and the preferences of the firms' decisionmakers. The supply of such jobs is also a function of the macroeconomic environment that affects the costs of introducing the more x-efficient systems of industrial relations (Levine and Tyson 1990) . Given the preferences of firm decisionmakers, there is no reason to expect that the demand for jobs in a higher paying and less hierarchical work environment will be met by the supply. This argument is illustrated in Diagram 3.
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CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXIX, SUPPLEMENT/NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL 2003 AB and CD represent the supply of x-efficient jobs, the supply of which is negatively related to the macro-institutional costs of producing such jobs. AB and CD are given by the preferences of the firms' decisionmakers by pressures on the firm, such as higher wages, to produce more x-efficient jobs. Workers demand 0D of x-efficient jobs. But given supply curve AB, a maximum of 0B such jobs can be generated. This is when the macro-institutional costs of so doing are zero. However, more x-efficient jobs are supplied as the supply curve shifts to the right due to changes in the decisionmakers' preferences, resulting from labour cost pressures, or to legal constraints forcing firms to adopt a more cooperative industrial relations organizational framework. In this case, the maximum supply of xefficient jobs is 0D. Moreover, given a particular macro-institutional cost of becoming more x-efficient, such as 0E, the supply of x-efficient jobs can vary, from 0F to 0G, for example, depending upon the position of the supply curve. In other words, the macro cost of providing x-efficient jobs does not completely constrain the supply of such jobs. In the real world, despite the existence of the x-efficient alternative, the supply of x-efficient jobs, in the world economy, remains in the direction of AB. This is to be expected, given the preferences of firm decisionmakers and the economic viability of the x-inefficient option.
A classic example of the positive effects of a superior system of industrial relations on productivity is the NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.) experiment in the United States, where Toyota entered into a joint venture with General Motors, taking over the management of GM's plant in Freemont, California in 1983 which GM had closed in 1982, eventually transforming what was GM's least productive plant into its most productive. Prior to the takeover, the Freemont plant's labour productivity was half of Toyota's, with one of the highest defect rates in the industry. And this was after GM's $150 million investment prior to closing the plant, making it a state-of-the-art manufacturing facility in terms of plant and equipment. Toyota introduced into the Freemont plant its particular system of production, inclusive of team production, wage flattening, job security, worker input into plant management, and a form of gainsharing. But little else changed. Toyota even hired back the militant trade union leaders and most of the other workers formerly employed by GM in the Freemont plant. Toyota engaged in this experiment, in spite of the fact that America's macro-institutional environment is considered to be a deterrent to adopting more efficient and cooperative systems of industrial relations. In quick order, productivity doubled and the defect rate collapsed in the Freemont plant causing it to became GM's most productive American plant, even more so than its much more automated, technologically advanced plants (Levine 1995; Levine and Tyson 1990; Ichniowski, Thomas, Levine, Olson and Strauss 1996) . Adopting a more x-efficient system of work organization was obviously not contingent upon the existence of a more ideal macro-institutional environment. In spite of this success, the NUMMI example was not replicated in other GM plants with the exception of the Saturn venture. The typical GM plant remains largely within the domain of the traditional, relatively non-cooperative, and often conflict-ridden system of industrial relations. The NUMMI alternative was an option that could be forgone by firm decisionmakers even in the relatively competitive automobile manufacturing market given the economic viability of the x-inefficient alternatives. The cost of foregoing the NUMMI alternative is the resulting x-inefficiency. 11
GROWTH MODELLING
In the traditional Solow growth model per capita growth cannot be sustained over time unless one introduces exogenous technical change, since per capita growth is otherwise a function of capital per worker, where the productivity effect of the latter is subject to diminishing returns. The production function is subject to constant returns. Increasing the propensity to save can increase growth, but this propensity is subject to the binding constraint of the consumption wants of the economic agent. Increasing savings can have a permanent effect on the level of per capita income, but this effect is limited by how much savings can be increased by. The Solow growth narrative is contained in the following equation:
where m is the exogenously given rate of technical change, n is the rate of growth in the labour force, s is the marginal propensity to save, and
capital to labour ratio. The technical change coefficient m becomes a permanent feature of the growth equation insofar as technical change is a permanent and persistent feature of the economy. Applied to the domain of the determination of per capita output and its rate of growth, given the assumption of diminishing returns to factor inputs, sustained growth is a product of sustained (exogenously determined) technical change since it is technical change, independent of changes in the capital to labour ratio that drives sustained increases in labour productivity. Moreover, given the assumption of diminishing returns, differences in per capita output must be largely a product of different rates of technical change between economies (Parente and Prescott 2000) . 12 More generally, the growth in real GDP is a function of the growth in factor inputs plus the rate of technical change, and the growth in labour productivity becomes a function of the growth in the capital to labour ratio (which is subject to diminishing returns) and the rate of technical change.
In the Solow growth model, this argument takes the following form, where A (t) is the "technical change" shift parameter, K is total capital stock, and L is employment. Constant returns to scale are assumed:
It is important to note that for Solow, technical change refers to a bundle of variables that are required to explain the growth in the economy that cannot be explained by simple increases in traditional factor inputs. The new growth literature attempts to explain differences in growth rates and per capita output by endogenizing technological change by causally relating research and development and human capital formation to technical change or Solow's shift parameter and by assuming imperfect product markets. The behavioural model of growth offers an alternative and perhaps complementary perspective on the causes of technical change, writ large, which is more consistent with the Solow model and relatively competitive product markets.
In terms of the behavioural model of growth, I assume three effects, the first two being most important (Altman 1998; Altman 2001a, ch. 6) : first, the x-efficiency effect whereby increasing labour costs induce increases in the level of x-efficiency. This shifts the Solow production function outwards. 13 Second, the technological progress effect whereby high-wage firms are forced to adopt already available technologies that are new to these firms.
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CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXIX, SUPPLEMENT/ These firms may also find it worthwhile to develop new technologies (to innovate), involving investment in research and development. Technological progress shifts the production function outwards. 14 Low-wage firms need not adopt the new technology or innovate if they can effectively compete on the basis of low wages. Moreover, the low-wage regime may result in labour being too x-inefficient for the new technology to be cost-effective. For the new technology to be adopted by all firms it must be cost effective in the sense of lowering unit costs to all firms, even to the low-wage firms, such that by not adopting the new technology they will lose their competitive edge. When new technology yields such a threshold effect, the production function is shifted outwards for all firms (Rosenberg 1982) . In the absence of a threshold effect, only the high-wage firms adopt the new technology. 15 Third, the savings effect refers to a situation where high-wage firms are forced to increase the propensity to save so as to increase the rate of investment under pressure to adopt new technology or new forms of organization by higher rates of labour compensation. This may result in an increase in the economy's propensity to save. To the extent that the savings rate actually increases, the production function shifts upwards. It is important to keep in mind that to the extent that increasing wages (with workers being characterized by a relatively low propensity to save) serves to pull down the economy-wide or average propensity to save, the production function can be shifted downward. However, there is no clear and evident relationship between savings rates and economic growth or levels of per capita output. High rates of per capita output can be achieved by low-savings economies. Whereas, high-savings economies are often found amongst the world's least-developed economies (Parente and Prescott 2000) .
In the behavioural model, per capita growth is affected by the choices economic agents make in terms of effort, technology, and savings. The relative cost of labour, embedded in a particular system of industrial relations, is a key determinant of these choices. Where labour costs can be kept low, per capita income and growth rates can be expected to be relatively low. Moreover, in this model convergence in terms of per capita output and labour productivity is not the expected outcome by dint of market forces alone. There first must be a convergence of labour costs and work cultures. In this case, convergence can be either toward the low-or high-wage economy since both are consistent with competitiveness in the market economy. Neither the low-nor high-wage economy need have a unit cost advantage over the other. What the behavioural model suggests is that Solow's shift parameter is driven by what happens inside the firm. Higher wages and improved working conditions serve to shift the production function outward as well as inducing more capital intensity in production (Altman 2001a, ch. 6 ). This point is roughly contained in the following equation:
Here the level of output is driven by relative rates of labour compensation between economies (W i / W j ), where in a simple model the output of the two (or more) economies are identical. Output increases can also be driven by increases in wages or labour costs in the sense that such increases would otherwise squeeze the share of income going to the employers. Labour productivity is increased largely through the x-efficiency effect and induced technical change. In the short run, the rate of per capita growth increases in this model as the economy adjusts to the new higher level of per capita output. In the long run, the growth rate in output will converge toward the growth rate of the labour force. But the three wage effects can be expected, at a minimum, to increase long-run real per capita output and the short-run per capita growth rate.
In this model, the focus is upon particular behavioural variables as driving the growth process and differentials in per capita productivity and income. But this in no way excludes other variables exogenous to this model from being causally important. Research and development expenditures inside and outside (public sphere) the firm and Schumpeterian process and product innovations, that are so important to the new growth theory, can also play a prominent role. However, the behavioural model suggests that the wage effects, discussed above, can play an important causal role in affecting these potential contributions to the growth process, with labour costs being the independent variable. Moreover, the behavioural model suggests that labour costs and the level of x-inefficiency in the firm affect the profitability of adopting any new innovation. 16 However, innovations that yield threshold levels of unit costs or profits make it cost competitive for all firms, irrespective of factor prices and the work cultures of their firms, to invest in such innovations. In time, such globally profitable technologies should yield increasing productivity to all economies. But if this were the only game in town, there should not be the type of persistent inequalities in income that characterize the contemporary world economy (Thorbecke and Charumilind 2001) . The behavioural model offers one potential explanation for why persistent inequalities exist and why these inequalities can persist even under competitive economic regimes. 17 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The behavioural model of the firm and growth presented here has implications for an understanding of the evolution of income distribution through historical time and the distribution of income distributions across economies at a particular point in time. Referring back to our discussion of Pareto Optimality, the behavioural model suggests that increasing workers' wages can positively affect productivity growth and thereby the level of per capita output, this without negatively affecting the income of the other group income claimants within the firm. Wherever this type of modelling scenario applies, first-period income redistribution that is a product of increasing the income or in-firm benefits to employees is not only consistent with economic growth, it also contributes to economic growth. It is simply a product of the x-efficiency, technological progress, and savings effects, discussed above. In this scenario, it is possible to increase the income of one individual or group of individuals without reducing the income of another. Therefore, income redistribution need not be a zero-sum game and it can be consistent with Pareto Optimality seen from a dynamic perspective.
The behavioural model predicts that because a positive causal relationship exists between labour costs and labour and total factor productivity, it is highly unlikely that increasing wage inequality is a necessary condition for per capita economic growth. At a minimum, maintaining low real-wage growth of the least paid workers is a highly unlikely necessary condition for per capita economic growth. Moreover, under reasonable assumptions, one would expect that such growth is consistent with lower levels of wage inequality. Given that wage inequality is a key determinant of income inequality one would also expect that when wage inequality diminishes so should income inequality. But this need not always hold true. For example, as already discussed, increasing divorce rates and, related to this, increasing atomization of families can contribute toward increasing income inequality, holding wage inequality constant. So would an increasing correlation between the income of husbands and wives, holding wage inequality constant (Burtless 1999 (Burtless , 2001 . Moreover, income distribution becomes more unequal independent of changes in wage inequality when employment rates and hours worked changes differentially in favour of the higher income groups. Thus, even if there are no changes in wage inequality, income inequality increases when employment rates and hours worked change at either the bottom or the top-end of the income distribution (Osberg 2001) . This being said, the behavioural model predicts that high levels of income inequality or increasing levels of income inequality are not necessary conditions to economic prosperity and growth. In a simple behavioural model, where x-inefficiency exists and technical change is induced by labour costs, and assuming one homogenous output and two income groups, workers and employers, wage inequality is reduced within the firm as the wage rate increases. This is illustrated in Table 4 , in the Sector One dynamics, where wage inequality drops from 5 to 3.4 as wages increase. If one assumes that minimum wage legislation and unions drive the income of workers, then in this scenario wage inequality is reduced through such interventions in the economy and increased as such interventions are reduced or eliminated. Bear in mind that in the behavioural model, introducing or increasing existing minimum wages and successful union efforts to increase labour compensation and improve working conditions need not increase unit costs or reduce profits. This narrative is consistent with evidence for the US and the UK, for example, that experienced the developed world's most substantive increases in wage inequality over the 1970 -80 to 1990 -2000 period (Fortin and Lemieux 1997 Freeman 1996; Atkinson 1997) . Other variables might also have affected the extent of wage inequality, but the behavioural model suggests the importance of legislative or institutional interventions to this process. One would also expect that both minimum wages and unions to positively affect the growth process, whereas their removal or weakening should contribute to the slowing of economic growth. This type of scenario can also be applied to discuss the possible effects of low unemployment rate policy upon income inequality, a point elaborated upon empirically by Galbraith (1998) . In this case, lower unemployment rates affect most significantly the wages of the lowest paid, least well-organized workers, thereby increasing their wage relative to those of the higher income workers and other claimants on income. This increase in wages not only serves to reduce wage inequality, but in the behavioural model it is paid for through the increased productivity that is generated. These results easily translate to a multi-sector model where one sector is high wage and low inequality and the other is low wage and high inequality. In Table 4 , Panel 6, simply by increasing the wage in Sector Two (the low-wage sector), wage inequality is reduced and productivity is enhanced. Reducing the wage in Sector Two, on the other hand, serves to increase inequality and diminish labour productivity. Note that in these scenarios, it is not income redistribution that is driving changes in income distribution. Rather, it is the relative improvements in workers' income joined with improvements in productivity that yield reductions in income inequality.
In another scenario, with more than one sector, it is clear that the evolution of inequality critically depends upon what occurs within sectors and changes, if any, in the relative importance of the sector within the economy, a point made decades ago by Kuznets (1955) in his classic work on income inequality. Although the behavioural model predicts less wage and income inequality when wages rise, this need not take place in a multi-sector economy where wages are increasing in one sector while diminishing in another. Here, the results are ambiguous, much depending on the extent of wage changes in the sectors and changes in the relative importance of the sectors (Table 4 , Panels 1 and 2). Even in a scenario where wages are increasing in one sector, with consequent reductions in inequality (say as a result of unionization and tight labour markets), while inequality remains stable in the high inequality sectors, inequality increases if the high inequality sectors become relatively more important (Table 4 , Panel 3). In this case, mean wages might be increasing in the economy as a whole, while inequality is increasing as well, as a result of a change in the relative importance of the different sectors to the economy. On the other hand, inequality diminishes as a consequence of reducing the relative importance of the high inequality sectors (Table 4 , Panels 4, 5, and 8). Inequality can also increase as the high-wage sector leads the growth process. In this scenario, the wage gap between the highly paid workers in the high-wage sector and the low-wage workers in the low-wage sector increases. In this case, to the extent that the low-wage workers are x-inefficient, the wage gap could be reduced by introducing minimum wages, for example, which serves to increase the wages for the lowest paid workers, thereby keeping wage inequality from increasing to the extent that it would otherwise.
The behavioural model is also consistent with a scenario that typifies economies where important outputs are exported and the price of which can be subject to price shocks, however determined. In such an economy real wages might be increasing and wage inequality decreasing in the domestic sector. However, in the export sector, if positive price shocks result in the income of the employers increasing, this can cause an economy-wide increase in wage inequality (Table 4 , Panel 7). In this case, increasing mean wage inequality is consistent with both increasing wages in at least one sector and increasing measured income in the economy. Of course, such increasing inequality need not occur if employees are able to capture some of the rents achieved in the export sector as a result of positive price shocks.
At a more specific level, the behavioural model also speaks to the potential role of human capital formation in terms of both formal education and skill formation, age structure, and technical change as possible determinants of income inequality. If one assumes that all economic agents are homogeneous and producing an identical product using an identical technology, in a world of x-efficiency, all economic agents should be paid the same wage (representing all forms of labour compensation) in long-run competitive product market equilibrium. In other words, in this scenario, the marginal product would be identical for all workers with wages equalized across all workers. But this scenario simply establishes an ideal type. In a world where x-inefficiency prevails differentially across firms as a product of different institutional parameters faced by firms and of different work cultures or systems of industrial relations adopted by firms, wages need not be identical in long-run equilibrium. Higher wage firms are relatively more x-efficient and, therefore, cost competitive, with the relatively low-wage and x-inefficient firms. So, for example, wages can be higher for unionized workers in what would be the relatively more x-efficient firms than in the relatively x-inefficient non-unionized shops. In other words, otherwise identical workers would be receiving different wage rates. 18 This would have the effect of causing a certain level of wage inequality that is unnecessary from the perspective of technical constraints faced by the firm.
But even if human capital factors, age distribution, and technology dictate a particular inequality in the distribution of income in an x-efficient longrun equilibrium, the distribution of income predicted in such an x-efficient scenario need not be obtained in a world where x-inefficiency exists. The key point here is that even if the technical constraints within the firm dictate a Gini coefficient of 0.3, a Gini of 0.4 might be obtained if different firms are characterized by different work cultures as in where one set of firms pays higher wages and is more x-efficient than another. The relatively low-wage firms are simply paying workers less than need be given the existence of organizationally induced x-efficiency. Technical factors such as human capital and technology only set the parameters within which wage or income distribution levels must fall. But according to the behavioural model, whether the minimum inequality allowed for by these technical parameters is realized depends on how the firm is organized. And this, in turn, is affected by institutional parameters such as unions, minimum wages, social goods like unemployment insurance, and employment policy.
More specifically, for example, human capital formation need not generate increasing real income to those with more human capital vested in them from the perspective of the behavioural model. Nor need the convergence in levels of human capital yield a convergence in wage rates (Herzenberg, Alic and Wial 1998) . On the other hand, a divergence in levels of human capital need not yield a divergence in wage rates. In point of fact, convergence in formal education has not resulted in the convergence S112 Parente and Prescott 2000) . For one, higher levels of human capital yield higher wages and a higher level of productivity depending on the production function in which it is contained. PhDs employed in fast food restaurants, for example, will not earn high wages. In the behavioural model, human capital endowments, vested in the overall production function of the firm, set the outerbound parameters to the productivity a worker can achieve, ceteris paribus. Some workers can produce below potential and earn below potential, no matter their human capital endowment, depending upon the organizational parameters of the firm. Such x-inefficiency can yield more income inequality than need be. For example, workers with a high school education or less, might earn less than is necessary, given their potential productivity, in the absence of minimum wage legislation (Fortin and Lemieux 1997; Freeman 1996) . In a behavioural model, ceteris paribus, introducing or increasing minimum wages, within limits, can serve to increase the level of x-efficiency and induce technical change, allowing for the higher wages to be cost competitive whilst also serving to reduce income inequality.
CONCLUSION
Building upon the insights of the x-efficiency, efficiency wage, and industrial relations literature, the behavioural model of the firm and economic growth discussed in this paper suggests that labour market conditions and how the firm is organized play an important causal role in determining productivity, per capita output differentials, and in determining the extent of income inequality. Where labour costs and firm organization affect the efficiency of the firm, high-wage firms can be cost competitive with low-wage firms, union firms with non-union firms and, more generally, high-wage economies can be costs competitive with low-wage economies. Moreover, in this behavioural analytical framework, increasing income equality need not be a zero-sum game when this involves improving the level of material well-being of workers. For this can positively affect the size of the economic pie by affecting the firm's overall level of efficiency. In this case, a more equal distribution of income is consistent with and a contributing factor to higher rates of growth and higher levels of per capita output. In this scenario, more wage or income equality need not be at someone else's expense since more income equality is not achieved through the process of income redistribution, at least in a multi-period framework. Related to this, institutional factors such as minimum wages, unions, and tight labour market policy can serve not only to reduce wage income inequality, but also toward making an economy relatively more efficient. Finally, from a behavioural perspective, the extent of wage and income inequality is not simply a product of technical parameters embodied in the traditional production function, it is also affected by institutional variables. The production function only sets the outer boundary within which an array of income distributions, all of which are cost competitive, can be realized. This type of modelling of the firm and economy suggests a greater degree of freedom in the determination of the degree of income inequality, from the perspective of public policy and economic analysis than is suggested by more traditional perspectives where income redistribution and, more generally, more income equality, is at best a zero-sum game and, at worst, a cause of economic inefficiency.
There are some direct public policy implications of the behavioural model for issues related to income distribution. First and foremost, the behavioural model suggests that to the extent that there is an efficiency or technological change effect that flows from improvements in the material wellbeing of workers, policy should be designed to encourage such improvements and, moreover, to facilitate the realization of such an efficiency and technological change effect. For example, minimum wages and unions can serve to improve both the well-being of workers and to the productivity performance of the firm. Additionally, from a more macroeconomic perspective, policy that serves to Economic Growth and Income Equality S113 CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXIX, SUPPLEMENT/NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL 2003 maintain low unemployment rates by improving the bargaining power of labour can have an efficiency effect and technology effect through the impact that resulting improvements in wages and working conditions might have on the firm's level of xefficiency and on its technology. A similar case can be made with regard to maintaining reasonable unemployment insurance as well as social insurance programs, both of which affect the bargaining power of labour. However, the behavioural model does not infer that efficiency and technology effects automatically or costlessly flow from improvements in material level of well-being of workers. Government policy that facilitates firms adopting and investing in improvements in industrial relations, the skill enhancement of workers, and the development and adoption of new technology or adopting existing relatively more productive technologies, for example, facilitate firms realizing higher levels of productivity to, at a minimum, offset the higher costs accruing from improvements to labour compensation. None of these policies are redistributive in nature. Rather, they are geared toward building a more productive economy in a manner where workers, inclusive of those at the lower deciles of the income distribution, capture a significant share of an increasing economic pie. As a consequence of the dynamic relationship, specified by the behavioural model, between labour compensation and economic efficiency and growth, facilitated by government policy, the distribution of income can become more equal over time. But it is not more income equality per se that generates more efficiency and growth. In the behavioural model discussed here, causality runs from efficiency and growth to more income equality, where increased income equality is a likely outcome of a more productive economy built upon improvements in the material well-being of workers. Galbraith (1998) for a critical discussion of this hypothesis, which has been used to explain the contemporary increase in American wage inequality. 7 For example, Leibenstein argues that in a world of effort discretion x-efficiency in production requires firm members making effort choices involving, "cooperation with peers, superiors, and subordinates, in such a way as to maximize their contribution to output" (1978, p. 206) . The work environment within the firm, in this scenario, plays a fundamental causal role in affecting the level of x-efficiency achieved by the firm. 8 This modern perspective is in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom prior to World War II, which is well articulated by Pigou: "it is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since this enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. The old law of 'diminishing utility' thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, increase economic welfare" (1952, p. 89) . See also Cooter and Rappoport (1984) . 9 This literature finds that more and higher quality effort inputs are associated with a bundle of characteristics that include more active employee participation in the functioning of the firm, more labour-management cooperation associated with a less hierarchical system of management, labour compensation related to labour productivity, and a relatively long-term employment relationship with the firm. On the latter point, see also Carmichael and MacLeod (2000) . 10 The conventional wisdom assumes that changes in relative factor prices affect the relative efficient combination of factor inputs, such as capital and labour. Thus, increasing the relative price of labour is expected to increase the capital to labour ratio, modelled as movements along the production isoquant, thereby making labour productive on the margin. This most efficient use of factor inputs, however, yields higher unit production costs ceteris paribus. Changes in factor prices are not expected to affect the position of the production isoquant, however. In contrast, I argue that changes in relative factors can also be expected to shift the isoquant. Increasing the relative price of labour, for example, can be expected to also shift inwards to the production isoquant, thus either keeping unit costs from rising or reducing unit costs. This induced technical change serves to increase total factor productivity as well as labour productivity (Altman 2001a, chs. 2 and 6) .
NOTES
11 See Gordon (1996) and Smith (1995) , for further examples of relatively x-efficient forms of organization that remain outside the mainstream of industrial organization. 12 Per capita output (Y/P) is given by output per worker (Y/L) and the ratio of employment to the population (L/P):
. Assuming a constant employment rate, in the Solow model, per capita output is determined by the level of labour productivity which, in turn, is largely a product of technical change.
in the capital-labour ratio as well as inward shifts of the firm's production isoquant.
